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President’s message
Glass half full (Part 1) – ASF Prevention

Prior to 2018, foreign animal disease (FAD) prevention, preparedness, and response discussions in case of an emergency outbreak revolved around foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), thinking the United States was most at risk of contracting this FAD compared to others. Now of course, due to the recent rapid global spread of African swine fever (ASF) in China, Southeast Asia, and parts of Europe and Africa, our focus has changed. There are more than 40 countries infected with ASF, and the latest data collected on June 28 from the World Organization for Animal Health shows 14 countries and territories currently suffering from new or ongoing outbreaks of the disease.1

This increased risk puts our industry in significant jeopardy of an ASF outbreak which could cost billions of dollars annually.2 During a two-day ASF planning meeting in May, the audience of state and federal officials, academicians, swine producers, and veterinarians was asked, “How many of you think the US swine industry will have an ASF outbreak within the next 5 years?” The resulting show of hands indicated 40% think the crisis would happen; it is not if, but when. The remaining 60% had their “glass half full”, believing it would never happen, or at least not within the near future. Either way, it’s just speculation. An FAD could happen tomorrow or never. But realize the US government and swine industry leadership are making tremendous efforts to prevent it from happening.

First line of defense

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The most likely path for ASF to enter the United States would be via contaminated pork products through one of the 328 US land, air, or sea ports of entry, 186 of which allow agricultural imports. In a conversation with Kevin Harringer (April 2019), CBP’s executive director for the Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison office, the AASV Executive Board learned:

The CPB is doing an excellent job, however, they need more agriculture inspectors, beagles, and traveler awareness to continue to mitigate FAD risk at our borders. All confiscated food products are incinerated, but not tested for specific FADs using polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Other at-risk countries, such as Australia, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand, all have intercepted many PCR-positive ASF pork products coming from China at their ports of entry. It is very possible ASF-positive pork products have already crossed our borders as well. African swine fever is a global phenomenon and all these countries are helping to make travelers aware of the dangers and to stop bringing in food/meat/pork.

Plate waste feeding and Swine Health Protection Act. Via the Swine Health Protection Act, the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has had controls in place for decades on international garbage, including waste from ships, airlines, and international conveyances. Controls require all international garbage to be disposed of appropriately and under APHIS supervision. For example, transported under seal to approved incineration facilities. Epidemiological studies have shown that contaminated garbage from international airports and ports is an important source of the virus.4 The ASF virus can persist for weeks, or even months, in frozen or uncooked meat. It is very stable in cured or smoked pork products. Virus was found to be inactive in Parma ham after 300 days5 and in Iberian loins after 112 days.6

Although garbage feeding may be a less likely source of ASF entry into the United States, it still is a significant risk. Remember, a pig finishing unit licensed to feed airport waste containing FMD contaminated meat was the index case for the 2001 FMD epidemic in the United Kingdom,7 which cost the public sector £3 billion (US $3.7 billion) and the private sector more than £5 billion (US $6.2 billion).8

Imported feed ingredient risk of FAD. Importation of pigs or fresh pork products into the United States from ASF-positive countries is regulated by APHIS. The agency does not regulate importation of feed ingredients from these countries, so the industry will need to respond. We are aware of the models showing the ASF virus ability to survive in feed ingredients in trans-Pacific transit from Beijing to Des Moines.9 We are aware of the environmental stability and the low infectious dose of 103 in feed and 100 in water to infect pigs.10 The United States imports significant amounts of vitamins, amino acids, and soybean products from China. The Swine Health Information Center (SHIC), along with the University of Minnesota, have sponsored workshops to increase our understanding of the vitamin supply chain and the soybean supply chain regarding the ASF risk to US agriculture:

Second line of defense

Farm and feed mill biosecurity. African swine fever is anticipated to become endemic in China. The threat will not go away. If ASF were ever to enter the United States via contaminated pork products, restaurant waste, or feed ingredients, it would still have to make the giant leap onto at least one pig farm. Therefore, strict biosecurity standard operating procedures are the second line of defense to prevent any FAD crisis. This is where all pork producers, swine veterinarians, and feed suppliers are ultimately responsible and critically important to prevent a potential disaster. Educate your clients on FADs. Enroll them in the Secure Pork Supply Plan; the biosecurity discussion itself is worth the effort to implement this program. Feed mill biosecurity needs to change from an oxymoron to a reality. Adhering to recommended feed holding times to mitigate virus transmission is an important biosecurity step.13

Because of AASV, the National Pork Board, the National Pork Producers Council, and SHIC actively working together and the tremendous support of APHIS, CPB, allied industries, and coalition groups, we are all doing our utmost to prevent ASF entry. This gives me optimism, confidence, and keeps my glass half full.

References

*1. Perez S, Brihn A, Perez A. Swine Disease Global Surveillance Report Monday, June 3, 2019 – Monday, July 1, 2019. https://www.swinehealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/SHIC-109-GSDMR-July-2019-7-1-19.pdf. Published July 2, 2019. Accessed July 17, 2019.

*2. 5m Editor. Special report: FAD outbreak could cost US agriculture $200 billion over 10 years. The Pig Site. February 13, 2019. https://thepigsite.com/news/2019/02/special-report-fad-outbreak-could-cost-us-agriculture-200-billion-over-10-years. Accessed July 25, 2019.

*3. DeAeth D. South Korea to increase fines for travelers carrying pork products. Taiwan News. May 21, 2019. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3707443. Accessed July 17, 2019.

*4. European Food Safety Authority Panel on Animal Health and Welfare. Scientific opinion on African swine fever. EFSA J. 2010;8(3):149. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2010.1556

5. McKercher PD, Yedloutschnig RJ, Callis JJ, Murphy R, Panina GF, Civardi A, Bugnetti M, Foni E, Laddomada A, Scarano C, Scatozza F. Survival of viruses in “Prosciutto di Parma” (Parma ham). Can Inst Food Sci Technol J. 1987;20:267-272.

6. Mebus CA, House C, Ruiz Gonzalo F, Pineda JM, Tapiador J, Pire JJ, Bergada J, Yedloutschnig RJ, Sahu S, Becerra V, Sanchez-Vizcaino JM. Survival of foot-and-mouth disease, African swine fever, and hog cholera viruses in Spanish serrano cured hams and Iberian cured hams, shoulders and loins. Food Microbiol. 1993;10:133-143.

*7. Scudamore JM. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Origin of the UK foot and mouth disease epidemic in 2001. http://adlib.everysite.co.uk/resources/000/095/936/fmdorigins1.pdf. Published 2002. Accessed July 17, 2019.

*8. National Audit Office. The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2002/06/0102939.pdf. Published June 18, 2002. Accessed July 25, 2019.

9. Dee SA, Bauerman FV, Niederwerder MC, Singrey A, Clement T, de Lima M, Long C, Patterson G, Sheahan MA, Stoian AMM, Petrovan V, Jones CK, De Jong J, Ji J, Spronk GD, Minion L, Christopher-Hennings J, Zimmerman JJ, Rowland RRR, Nelson E, Sundberg P, Diel DG. Survival of viral pathogens in animal feed ingredients under transboundary shipping models. PLOS ONE. 2018;13(3):e0194509. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0194509

10. Niederwerder MC, Stoian AMM, Rowland RRR, Dritz SS, Petrovan V, Constance LA, Gebhardt JT, Olcha M, Jones CK, Woodworth JC, Fang Y, Liang J, Hefley TJ. Infectious dose of Africa swine fever virus when consumed naturally in liquid or feed. Emerg Infect Dis. 2019;25(5):891-897. doi:10.3201/eid2505.181495

*11. Shurson J, Urriola P. Understanding the vitamin supply chain and relative risk or transmission of foreign animal diseases. https://www.swinehealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Understanding-the-vitamin-supply-chain-and-relative-risk-of-transmission-of-foreign-animal-diseases-6-28-19-final.pdf. Swine Health Information Center. Published May 2019. Accessed July 17, 2019.

*12. Sundberg P. Second SHIC-sponsored workshop addresses soybean supply chain and ASF feed risk. American Association of Swine Veterinarians web site. https://www.aasv.org/news/story.php?id=11846. Published July 17, 2019. Accessed July 17, 2019.

*13. National Pork Board. Holding time calculations for feed ingredients to mitigate virus transmission. https://library.pork.org/media/?mediaId=0B9B2956-6474-41D8-B6BA5A7F8F64C6A3. Published October 8, 2018. Updated May 6, 2019. Accessed July 17, 2019.

* Non-refereed references.

Nathan Winkelman, DVM
AASV President